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Abstract
Financial (positive or negative) and non-financial incentives or rewards are increasingly used in attempts to influence health
behaviours. While unintended consequences of incentive provision are discussed in the literature, evidence syntheses did
not identify any primary research with the aim of investigating unintended consequences of incentive interventions for
lifestyle behaviour change. Our objective was to investigate perceived positive and negative unintended consequences of
incentive provision for a shortlist of seven promising incentive strategies for smoking cessation in pregnancy and
breastfeeding. A multi-disciplinary, mixed-methods approach included involving two service-user mother and baby groups
from disadvantaged areas with experience of the target behaviours as study co-investigators. Systematic reviews informed
the shortlist of incentive strategies. Qualitative semi-structured interviews and a web-based survey of health professionals
asked open questions on positive and negative consequences of incentives. The participants from three UK regions were a
diverse sample with and without direct experience of incentive interventions: 88 pregnant women/recent mothers/
partners/family members; 53 service providers; 24 experts/decision makers and interactive discussions with 63 conference
attendees. Maternity and early years health professionals (n = 497) including doctors, midwives, health visitors, public health
and related staff participated in the survey. Qualitative analysis identified ethical, political, cultural, social and psychological
implications of incentive delivery at population and individual levels. Four key themes emerged: how incentives can address
or create inequalities; enhance or diminish intrinsic motivation and wellbeing; have a positive or negative effect on
relationships with others within personal networks or health providers; and can impact on health systems and resources by
raising awareness and directing service delivery, but may be detrimental to other health care areas. Financial incentives are
controversial and generated emotive and oppositional responses. The planning, design and delivery of future incentive
interventions should evaluate unexpected consequences to inform the evidence for effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and
future implementation.
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Introduction
There has been growing international academic and policy
interest in the use of financial incentives to change health
behaviours [1–3]. Similarly, there is evidence, particularly from
the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework, that financial
incentives to care providers can change health professional
behaviour resulting in improved health outcomes; however to
date disease rather than ‘lifestyle’ behaviour outcomes have been
the focus [4,5]. Literature on the mechanisms of action of
incentive interventions suggests that incentives can ‘‘crowd out’’
intrinsic motivation [6–8] when financial incentives are viewed as
paternalistic or undermining autonomy when recipients are ‘told
what to do’ [9].
‘Unintended consequences’ is a key area of contention within
incentive delivery. The phrase was first coined by Merton [10] and
refers to outcomes other than the ones intended by a purposeful
action. The purposeful actions intended by financial incentives in
health care are changes in behaviour (at citizen, patient,
healthcare provider or organisation level) which lead to evidence
of improved health outcomes (effectiveness and/or cost-effective-
ness). However, negative consequences have been reported,
particularly by the media which describe incentives as potentially
coercive or encouraging unhealthy behaviours or game playing to
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ensure eligibility [11–13], generating public and tax payers’ debate
about the appropriateness of incentives, particularly in countries
with state-funded health services.
Systematic reviews conducted as part of the BIBS (Benefits of
Incentives for Breastfeeding and Smoking Cessation) study, which
aimed to inform the design of incentive intervention trials for
smoking cessation in pregnancy and breastfeeding, provide the
background to this paper and are reported in full elsewhere
[14,15]. Incentives were defined as ‘financial (positive or negative)
and non-financial tangible incentives or rewards, such as free or
reduced cost items or services that have a monetary or an
exchange value’ [14]. Systematic reviews investigated i) the
evidence for the effectiveness of incentive interventions delivered
within or outside the health service, to: a) individuals, families or b)
organisations that aim to increase and sustain smoking cessation
and breastfeeding [14] and included a narrative review of
qualitative and process evaluation data; ii) a narrative synthesis
of qualitative reviews reporting barriers and facilitators to smoking
cessation and breastfeeding; iii) a scoping narrative review of
reviews of the effectiveness of financial incentives for other lifestyle
behaviours relevant to women of childbearing age.
Data relating to the consequences of incentive interventions
(intended and unintended) were extracted and analysed in these
reviews. In summary, the evidence syntheses did not identify any
primary research with the aim of investigating unintended
consequences of incentive interventions for lifestyle behaviour
change. Positive and negative unintended consequences of
incentive provision were sometimes referred to within the
discussion section of the papers. Gaming and cheating were
reported as a concern for incentives to influence smoking
cessation, particularly in high risk populations, (e.g. the vulnera-
ble/those with chaotic life styles) [16–18]. They may be considered
‘unfair’ for those who make healthy choices [19,20]. While
financial incentives to health care providers are considered to
narrow health inequalities between the most and least deprived
populations [4,21], a review of the evidence for incentive schemes
to encourage positive health and social behaviours in young people
identified that incentives targeted some groups and not others and
this was perceived as unethical and inequitable [22]. This review
[22] and a smoking cessation in pregnancy incentive intervention
delivered through pharmacies [23] suggest that incentive pro-
grammes may not achieve their intended demographic reach, with
more advantaged groups benefiting from the programme.
Furthermore, if behaviour change is not achieved, self-esteem
may be reduced and incentives that are negatively perceived can
cause harm, such as undesirable peer pressure and bullying
[22,24].
Incentives to providers have been reported to inadvertently
promote unethical ‘gaming’ behaviour, through distortion,
manipulation or concealment of data [25,26]. While incentives
can improve the performance and cost-effectiveness of care on
targeted conditions [4], large scale/complex incentive interven-
tions are administratively labour and resource-intensive [22,27].
Concerns have also been raised about the neglect of non-
incentivised conditions or patients for whom the conditional
quality target for providers to receive the incentive is more difficult
to achieve [4,26]. Evidence suggests that care provider efforts tend
to wane once the target has been achieved [4] and that
improvements occur at the fastest rate in the first year of a
programme and subsequently return to the pre-intervention rates
of improvement [4,21]. Incentives can improve teamwork,
enhance specialist skills [4,18,28] and facilitate connections
between providers and consumers [29]. However other studies
report reductions in person-centeredness, patient satisfaction and
continuity of care [4,30] as well as expectations for financial
reimbursement across other areas of health care [26].
In this paper, we report on mixed methods primary research on
the positive and negative unintended consequences of financial
incentive provision (to consumers and providers) where the
intended consequences are defined as smoking cessation and
breastfeeding behaviour change and maintenance around child-
birth and the unintended consequences concern outcomes other
than those intended. ‘Consumers’ refer to the target population
whose behaviour the incentive aims to change. Some, but not all,
will be health service patients. ‘Providers’ refer to any staff, services
or organisations which have a role in supporting women to stop
smoking in pregnancy and/or to breastfeed after birth.
Materials and Methods
Ethics
Full ethical approval for this study, including service user
involvement, was obtained from the North of Scotland Research
Ethics Committee (NOSRES, reference number: 12/NS/0041,
12th April 2012), and subsequent permissions were granted locally
by Research and Development, NHS Grampian (24th April 2012)
and the BUSH (Built & Natural Environment, Sport and Health)
Ethics Committee, University of Central Lancashire (BUSH064,
8th May 2012). Amendments were submitted to NOSRES. AM01
to cover the amendments required by BUSH (approved 10th May
2012); AM02 to allow us to use a flyer for recruiting health
professionals at conferences and an information leaflet designed
for partners/family/friends (approved 6th December 2012) and
AM03 to gain ethical approval for the contents of the general
public and health professionals survey (approved 17th April 2013).
Participants who took part in the interviews, focus groups or
interactive discussions provided written (for face to face inter-
views/focus groups) or verbal (for telephone interviews, interactive
discussions) informed consent to participate in this study. Survey
respondents were not requested to complete a consent form, rather
consent was implied by their participation. All consent procedures
received ethics approval.
Study design
Three evidence syntheses described above were integrated with
primary qualitative and survey research to investigate diverse
perspectives on incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy and
breastfeeding using a multi-disciplinary, mixed methods approach.
Researchers regularly engaged two mother-and-baby groups in
disadvantaged areas (study co-applicants) who provided diverse,
hard-to-reach service-user involvement.
Qualitative data
Setting and participants. Three settings (Lancashire, Glas-
gow and Aberdeen) were purposively selected for their diverse
socio-demographic characteristics and their different incentive
cultures for smoking cessation in pregnancy and breastfeeding
(Table 1 provides an overview of the demographics and charac-
teristics of the three selected sites). A third sector incentive scheme
designed for young parents had been implemented in Aberdeen.
Health service incentive schemes for both target behaviours had
been operating in Lancashire. In Glasgow, a concurrent health
service smoking cessation Phase II incentive trial was being
undertaken with a qualitative process evaluation [34].
Qualitative research involved purposive, theoretical and snowball
sampling undertaken by five interviewers (GT, NC, HM, JMcK,
SM) across the three sites to include individuals with and without
experience of incentive interventions. Participant recruitment was
Unintended Consequences
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facilitated by discussions with service managers and key workers in
health, social and third sector organisations. There were three
sample populations: a) pregnant women, new mothers and their
partners/family members who had become parents within the last 6
months; b) providers who could either deliver or receive incentives
to support women to initiate or maintain smoking cessation or
breastfeeding and c) experts and decision makers either in a
management/coordinator position potentially responsible for im-
plementing incentive programmes, e.g. a policy maker at local,
regional or national level or a member of a research ethics
committee.
Data collection. A range of qualitative methods were used
between November, 2012 and June, 2013, including unstructured
semi-structured and structured interviews with vignettes, focus
groups, interactive discussions and four open questions on a web
survey [14]. Our iterative approach to data collection and analysis
continually generated new research questions. For each question
we discussed as a research team the most appropriate qualitative
method for data collection. For example, to understand unintend-
ed consequences for specific promising interventions identified in
the evidence synthesis, we used vignettes to describe the aspects we
were interested in and identified participants (i.e. women, partners,
providers) who potentially could have been involved in such an
intervention to ascertain their views. To seek disconfirming data,
we conducted more unstructured individual interviews, rather
than a group discussion where there is a tendency towards
consensus, i.e. FG11 which involved a focus group with health
visitors from one geographical location.
Semi-structured interviews were used to explore participants’
knowledge, experiences and attitudes towards incentive provision
and the potential implications and consequences of incentives.
Topic guides were designed with the involvement of service users
and were modified iteratively as the study progressed. Eight
vignettes were developed from studies identified in the systematic
reviews, which were selected either because they had statistically
significant effects or involved an unusual, promising or innovative
approach. Six vignettes were used with mothers/partners/family
members [37–42] and four with professionals [34,37,39,43]
(Table 2). The vignettes were included in interviews and focus
groups to garner participants’ perspectives of the incentive
intervention. On two occasions, interviews were held in the
women’s homes; the remaining interviews/focus groups were held
at community or health and social care services locations (e.g.
mother and baby group, health clinic) or via the telephone.
Interviews/focus groups ranged from ,15 to 100 minutes and
were audio recorded and transcribed in full.
GT, HM, NC and PH facilitated and recorded interactive
discussions at three conferences (maternity/early years and public
health) comprising academic, third sector and health professionals
over the course of the study period to discuss the feasibility and
acceptability of incentive provision for consumers and providers.
Survey data
Setting, participants and data collection. The web survey
was distributed to maternity and early years staff working in
Scotland and North West England (see Appendix S1 for a full copy
of the survey). Recipients were identified and contacted by health
service gatekeepers to email lists for maternity services, child
health and primary care via NHS Research and Development
Networks, the Scottish Primary Care Research Network (SPCRN)
and a private company. The emails provided an introduction to
the study with a link to Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com).
With the exception of those reached through SPCRN, to whom
one reminder was sent by each of the regional co-ordinators to
their respective area email lists, no repeat emails were sent. All
respondents were offered entry into a draw to win one of forty £5
retail vouchers.
Survey design. A shortlist of seven promising incentive
strategies emerged from the BIBS study evidence syntheses
[14,15], service-user feedback and early qualitative data collection.
This shortlist informed the incentive descriptions used in the
survey to investigate health care professional acceptability and
anticipated consequences [14]. Survey questions asked participants
to respond using a 5 point Likert scale (1- strongly agree;
Table 1. Overview of recruitment sites.
Aberdeenshire has a mixed urban/town/rural population, with partners absent for long spells working offshore in fishing and the oil industry and pockets of affluence
and deprivation. In Grampian in 2012, 14.5% of women were reported as current smokers at antenatal booking and 13.5% at 10–14 days after birth [31]. In 2011/2,
58.4% of babies were being given some breast milk at 10–14 days, with 45.4% still receiving some breast milk at 6–8 weeks after birth [31]. Incentive culture: It has the
highest proportion in Scotland (71%) of smoking cessation services to pregnant women delivered through community pharmacists, who receive payments per person
registering for smoking cessation support and for data collection. In discussions between PH and providers in primary care and maternity services, many managers and
practitioners are resistant to providing financial incentives to patients following adverse media publicity about a smoking cessation incentive scheme in neighbouring
Tayside. Our co-applicant mother and baby group is an example of a partnership community development project which has raised money from local businesses to
provide non-financial incentives (a cre`che and subsidised cafe).
Glasgow has an urban multi-cultural population with a wide socio-demographic range from affluence to large areas of extreme disadvantage. 50% of households are
in areas of the highest material deprivation compared with 20% for Scotland as a whole. In 2012, 18.3% of women living in Greater Glasgow and Clyde were reported as
current smokers at antenatal booking and 15.3% at 10–14 days after birth [32]. In 2011/2, 43.4% of babies were being given some breast milk at 10–14 days, with 33.9%
still receiving some breast milk at 6–8 weeks after birth [33]. Incentive culture: The CPIT trial started in June 2011 and includes a qualitative element examining how
incentives are perceived by recipients and providers [34].
Lancashire has a mixed urban, small town and rural population with a wide socio-demographic range. For 2007 Indices of Deprivation, six local districts (including
Blackpool) are ranked within the top 50 in England and some towns have up to 35% of births to women of South Asian origin. Blackpool has one of the highest rates of
teenage pregnancy, one of the lowest breastfeeding initiation rates in 2012 (56% compared to 74% for England) and babies still breastfed at 6–8 weeks (24% compared
to 47% for England) [35]. Whilst smoking rates vary across the region, Blackpool has the highest overall rate with 30% of women smoking at the time of delivery in 2011/
12, which is over twice the national average for England (13%) [36]. Incentive culture: Lancashire is an innovative area for breastfeeding incentive schemes. The ‘Be a Star’
www.beastar.org.uk/archives/tag/be-a-star-adverts-lancashire campaign started in Lancashire in 2008 and promotes breastfeeding amongst 16–25 year old mothers. It
originated as a partnership between one of the Primary Care Trusts, Little Angels breastfeeding peer support organisation and The Hub social marketing agency. Be a
Star transforms local breastfeeding mums to look like models, celebrities, singers and actresses, making breastfeeding glamorous, sexy and appealing in posters and
provides breastfeeding support. Be a Star has been rolled out across 15 Primary Care Trusts in England with encouraging results. The Strategic Health Authority
provided funds to three areas in the North-West (one of which is NHS Blackpool Primary Care Trust) to run incentive schemes with the aim of increasing breastfeeding
duration at 6–8 weeks in 2011 by 5%. The community Star Buddies Breastfeeding Peer Supporters who are delivering the incentive scheme in Blackpool operate out of
St Cuthbert’s and Palatine Children’s Centre (our co-applicant base).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t001
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Table 2. Intervention vignettes.
SMOKING CESSATION STUDIES
Gulliver et al [38]
You and your partner/relative are invited to attend a 60 minute group with other expecting couples which is led by a psychologist at a local hospital, to discuss
pregnancy and smoking.
In the group, the psychologist wants to find out whether you are ready to give up smoking and if your partner/relative can help you. The group is told that giving up
smoking is possible and how it would improve their own and their baby’s health. You and your partner/relative are also invited to couple counselling appointments to
discuss your own experiences of smoking, and previous attempts to stop. You are told that the counselling appointments will include: working with a self-help manual
(Freedom from Smoking for You and Your Baby) and thinking about the triggers for smoking. You will be asked to sign a contract for your chosen stop smoking plan.
You are then invited to attend monthly appointments until your baby is three months old. At these appointments, you are asked about your smoking and have a breath
test to show whether you are still smoking or not. At each visit there is a raffle which you can enter to win gifts, regardless of whether you are still smoking or not. A car
seat is raffled every three months. Also, if you stay quit, and the breath test proves it, you will be given additional gifts donated by local businesses as they want to
support your efforts to stay smoke free. All your travel to and from appointments will be paid for.
Heil et al [39] – Version used with women/partners/other family members
At 18 weeks pregnant, you are invited to attend a stop smoking appointment. There, you are asked to agree a quit date, give a breath test and provide a urine sample
and you are also given a smoking cessation leaflet, which you discuss with staff members. If you agree to continue the service, you will have tests to assess whether you
are still smoking:
- every day for the next 5 days
- then twice weekly for another 7 weeks
- once a week for the next 4 weeks
- then fortnightly up until the baby is born
After your baby is born, you will also have to provide samples:
- every week for 4 weeks
- then fortnightly for the next 8 weeks (12 weeks in total)
- at a final assessment made at 24 weeks after the baby is born
You will receive vouchers for as long as you stay quit and these increase in value each time the test confirms that you have stopped smoking (starting from £10.00 at
first testing, and then increasing by £2.00 for each negative test – up to a maximum of £70.00). Any positive/missing results will reset the value of the vouchers (to
£10.00), however if you then have a further 2 negative results, the value of vouchers will be restored. During each visit you will discuss your smoking status and the
benefits of not smoking during pregnancy/after the birth; and at the end you will receive a pamphlet highlighting the reasons to remain non-smoking.
Heil et al [39] – Version used with professionals
At 18 weeks gestation, women are recruited to a smoking cessation intervention that involves daily, bi-weekly and then weekly contacts until the baby is born, with
further weekly and fortnightly contacts up to 12 weeks postnatal (with a final contact at 24 weeks). Urine and CO2 tests are used to confirm smoking status on each
occasion, and women are given opportunities to read/review smoking cessation information with a health worker. A voucher is given, which increases in value
(maximum of £40) each time a negative smoking test is confirmed, but values are re-set if a positive test is received.
Walsh et al [42]
You and your partner have been invited to attend a three session smoking cession programme. The programme consists of the following:
First session:
- You are given 2–3 minutes of risk information advice from a doctor, and shown a 14 minute video that contains risk information, barriers to quitting and how to
overcome them and stop smoking tips.
- Following the video, a 10 minute counselling session is provided by a midwife and a quit date is agreed.
- You receive a self-help manual as well as guidance on how to use it (this manual includes sections on risks, barriers, and smoking cessation).
- You and your partner are offered four packets of confectionary gum.
- Your partner is provided with a tip sheet, a contract and letter that stresses the importance of smoking cessation support.
- A sticker is placed on your medical records so that other professionals know that you are involved in the programme
Second and third sessions (held at approx. 34–36 weeks of pregnancy):
- On the 2nd and 3rd visits, a midwife will provide approximately 5 minutes of counselling support and a doctor will provide approximately 2 minutes of risk advice.
- Urine samples will be collected during these visits to test whether you are smoking
Follow-up:
- You will provide a further urine sample between 6–12 weeks after your baby has been born
- If your urine sample (provided at your second visit) is negative, your name is entered into a draw to win four donated prizes (approx. £120 each).
Tappin et al (CPIT study) [34]
Pregnant smokers are given a £50 voucher for attending an appointment with an NHS Smokefree Pregnancy advisor and setting a quit date. They are given an
additional £50 voucher for being smoke free 4 weeks after their quit date and another £100 voucher for being smoke free after 12 weeks. If they are still smoke free
towards the end of their pregnancy, they are given a further £200 voucher. Vouchers can be exchanged at many retailers.
BREASTFEEDING STUDIES
Chamberlain et al [37] – Version used with women/partners/other family members
You are offered a personal use double-electric breast-pump (worth £120–225, your brand of choice), which can be delivered to the hospital or to your home following
the birth of your baby. You will have access to a breastfeeding specialist in the hospital and you will be given a number for a breastfeeding telephone support line that
you can call from home.
Unintended Consequences
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5- strongly disagree) to seven promising incentive strategies
identified from evidence syntheses and qualitative interview data.
Five were incentives to women, including a free breast pump and
conditional shopping vouchers for verified proof of smoking
cessation at different time points and having a smoke-free home.
Two were incentives to providers: (i) payments to local health
services for reaching smoking cessation in pregnancy targets and
(ii) breastfeeding targets. Demographic data and experience of
target behaviours were recorded. To minimise framing effects, free
text questions about positive and negative consequences were
included, rather than a single question on unintended conse-
quences. The free text survey questions were: We would like you to
imagine that your local health service is going to run a scheme that
provides incentives for stopping smoking in pregnancy. What do
you think the consequence might be for participants and/or staff?
Qi) Positive consequences? Qii) Negative consequences? Identical
questions with breastfeeding inserted instead of stopping smoking
in pregnancy followed.
Data analysis
The first stage of analysis used a Framework approach [44] to
interpret the experiences and views of participants. A key strength
of the framework approach is its potential to allow data to be
summarised within thematic matrices and for patterns or
explanations to be identified. All qualitative interview data were
entered into NVivo10 software (QSR International, Burlington,
MA) to facilitate data organisation, coding and retrieval. Free-text
responses to open questions in the health professional survey on
the perceived consequences of incentive programmes were entered
onto an Excel chart and content analysis was used to triangulate
the analysis of the interview data. Data cleaning was undertaken
on the survey responses in that all comments not relating to the
question were recorded as ‘unsure’ to calculate a response rate for
each incentive consequences question. Initially, researchers (GT,
NC, HM) identified key themes and categories independently by
listening to and reading transcripts of the first four participant and
four provider interviews. Through wider research team transcript
reading and discussion, a single tree structure coding index was
agreed and applied in NVivo10 to the separate site datasets, with
2–4 weekly merges of datasets [14]. The researchers undertook a
detailed analysis of data with regular discussion several times a
week between sites to ensure consistency and to search for
disconfirming perspectives. Drafts of the findings and analysis were
circulated prior to weekly meetings with feedback provided by the
project lead (PH). Analysis continued until data saturation was
achieved.
A second stage of more in-depth data analysis was undertaken
for this investigation of the consequences of incentives. Braun &
Clark’s [45] thematic analysis was undertaken which involved
reading and re-reading of all the transcripts and free text
responses, followed by coding, organising and mapping the data
into groups and networks until saturation occurred. Initial data
analysis was undertaken by GT and the findings were shared and
discussed with NC, HM and PH for consensual validation of the
final emergent themes.
The qualitative research was conducted or overseen by social
science and/or health researchers, three of whom had been
involved in incentive interventions (GT, LB, and PH). The
research team included previous smokers, those with and without
children, experiences of breast and formula milk feeding who held
Table 2. Cont.
BREASTFEEDING STUDIES
Chamberlain et al [37] – Version used with professionals
A mother is offered a personal use double-electric breast-pump (worth £120–225, her brand of choice), which can be delivered to the hospital or to her home following
the birth of her baby. Whilst the mother is breastfeeding, she will have access to a breastfeeding specialist in the hospital and given a number for a breastfeeding
telephone support line that she can call from home.
Pugh et al [40]
Within 24 hours of having your baby you are asked whether you would like to take part in a parenting/breastfeeding programme. Once you have agreed, you are asked
to complete some questionnaires and provided with breastfeeding support. You are told that you will receive:
- At 3–4 days following the birth a nurse will visit you to discuss parenting issues/provide breastfeeding support.
- At 5 days following the birth a breastfeeding specialist will telephone you to discuss breastfeeding
- At 12 days after the birth, the nurse will visit you and offer flexible ‘non-nursing’ support based on what support you need, e.g. washing dishes, doing the laundry,
providing child-care.
- You are also told that further questionnaires will be sent to you for completion at 14 days and 6 weeks after the birth of your baby.
Volpe et al [41]
During your pregnancy, you are invited to attend three 1-hour weekly group sessions that provide education, information and support for parenting issues and
breastfeeding. Each week will focus on a different topic and you will be provided with a gift at the end of each session. The focus of the sessions and the gift provided
will be:
Week 1 (healthy eating) – chocolate cigar
Week 2 (safety) – electrical outlet covers
Week 3 (mothering the mother) – perfume
The sessions are run by a nurse/breastfeeding specialist – and a breastfeeding supporter will also be present to provide support and encouragement. The breastfeeding
supporter will continue to visit you after your baby has been born if you continue to breastfeed.
Cattaneo et al [43]
The Regional Health Authority has requested local health authorities to develop local work plans and targets to increase breastfeeding rates. The rates of exclusive,
predominant and complementary breastfeeding are to be measured at birth and at 16–19 weeks of age. All staff working within the health authority are told that a
financial penalty will be assigned if they do not achieve their objectives and targets
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t002
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different perspectives on incentive interventions for behaviour
change. Differences and potential biases were discussed in regular
team meetings and noted in reflective diaries kept by the
qualitative research team.
Results
Qualitative participants
A total of 177 participants took part in 16 focus groups, 55 face-
to-face interviews and 19 telephone interviews (Table 3). This
sample included 88 pregnant women/recent mothers/partners/
wider family members; 53 service providers, 24 experts/decision
makers and approximately 63 conference attendees participated in
an audio-recorded interactive discussion. Our interview partici-
pants represented women living in disadvantaged areas recruited
within and outwith health services with experience of smoking in
pregnancy and choosing not to breastfeed, ethnic diversity and
educational level (Table 4). Thirty women/parents had experience
of an incentive intervention (22 in the CPIT trial/incentive
intervention for smoking cessation; four in a NW England
breastfeeding incentive scheme; four in a third sector teenage
mothers’ programme). Twenty-three CPIT providers/experts
participated. Two experts had been involved in a different
voucher incentive programme for smoking cessation and one
expert was involved in a breastfeeding incentive intervention.
More detail linking the sample characteristics to ID codes and the
characteristics of who took part in the interviews and focus groups
are presented in Tables 5–8.
Survey participants
A total of 497 health and early years professionals responded to
the survey. The characteristics of the respondents are reported in
Table 9. The response rates to the free text questions are detailed
in Table 10. This table indicates that survey participants were
more likely to record positive rather than negative consequences
for both target behaviours. Most positive comments concerned the
expected health benefits associated with not smoking and
breastfeeding, and the intended consequences of incentive delivery
of smoking quit rates and increased breastfeeding.
The four emergent themes that integrated positive and negative
unintended consequences are: addressing or creating inequalities;
enhancing or diminishing motivation and wellbeing; relationships
with others; and impact on health systems and resources. These
are summarised in Table 11. In the following sections, each theme
is described and illustrated with quotes from participants.
Participant quotes have been assigned a code, for example (FG5,
I, mother), which describes whether the participant took part in a
focus group (FG), interactive discussion (IA), survey (S), telephone
interview (T), or face-to-face interview (no code), and gives the
participant identification number. The code also indicates whether
or not the participant had been involved in an incentive
programme (I versus no letter) and describes participant charac-
teristics: professional background, whether the mother was
pregnant for the first time (pregnant mother), a mother (who
may or may not have been pregnant again) or a wider family
member. Where appropriate, the findings have been integrated
across the different participant groups. Where distinctions between
participant groups are relevant, the term ‘consumer’ has been used
for ‘women/partners/family member’ comments, and ‘profession-
al’ relates to comments from providers/experts/conference
attendees.
Addressing or Creating Inequalities
Financial incentives for smoking cessation and breastfeeding
when discussed in relation to the Tappin et al. [34] and Heil et al.
[39] intervention vignettes were considered to have ‘appeal’
particularly amongst teenage mothers and/or families ‘where
money is an issue’ to ‘attract’ or ‘persuade’ them to engage in
health services and for a ‘meaningful conversation’ to enable them
to make ‘informed choices’ regarding their health behaviours:
I think if you were young, or if you were on your own and you
might feel a big judged at times, or a bit….you know, why’s
this person coming to look at me again, you know and I think
the incentive scheme can only kind of help that really and
make it a nicer experience (T9, I, mother).
Professionals perceived consumer incentives to be a ‘foot in the
door’, leading to a ‘greater uptake of services’ particularly for ‘those
in need’, leading to ‘improved health outcomes and opportunities to
engage in other health advice’. However, the capacity to increase
health inequalities due to marginalised families and those with
very chaotic lifestyles being less likely to be aware of, and engage
with, incentive provision was a concern amongst a number of the
professionals:
It’s those that understand the system that benefit most and
they’re the ones that least need it. So if there was an incentive
scheme you can be pretty sure that everyone earning between
£25,000 and £70,000 a year will be taking advantage of
that incentive scheme whereas those who are on £8,000 a year
won’t even know about the incentive scheme (FG12, providers
& expert).
Concerns were raised by participants that incentive withdrawal
consequent on continued smoking or relapse, or on reduced or
discontinued breastfeeding could lead to women being less likely to
‘report problems’ or ‘non-engagement’ due to professionals ‘going
on at me to give up [smoking]’ or continue breastfeeding.
Incentives for smoking cessation were considered by many of
the participants to be ‘unfair’, for example, by ‘rewarding’
smokers who are doing ‘something they know to be detrimental to
health’ or penalising those who ‘are doing the right thing’. Some
perceived this as counter to parenting and education practices in
terms of ‘positive reinforcements’ for good, rather than negative
behaviour:
If you are a pregnant mum and not smoking, you should be
incentivised because you are being the role [model] so that
might give the others mums who smoke motivation to stop,
knowing what they could get so you are rewarding the good
behaviour (FG2, mothers).
Many professionals also raised concerns when discussing the
Cattaneo et al intervention vignette [43] about how incentives to
providers associated with meeting targets for smoking cessation
and breastfeeding would be ‘inequitable’, ‘unrealistic’ and ‘unfair’
when women’s decisions and choices were considered largely
outside of their control, particularly for those working in areas of
high deprivation where smoking and formula feeding are more
prevalent.
Other participants felt that incentives could ‘stigmatise’ and
create ‘polarisation’ and ‘discrimination’ between different groups
of women (e.g. those who breastfeed and those who formula feed),
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Table 3. Study participants.
Participants Number interviewed Totals and format
Mother and baby groups:
co-applicant
Participants N=12
Aberdeenshire n = 6 Focus groupsa n = 3
Blackpool n = 6 Face-to-face interviews n= 2
Pregnant women and recent
parents
Participants N=88
Pregnant women n= 38b Focus groupsa n = 8
Postnatal women n= 45 Face-to-face interviews n= 39
Partners n = 5 Telephone interviews n = 6
Providers Participants N=53
Midwifery n = 11 Focus groupsa n = 10
Nursing n = 1 Face-to-face interviews n= 13
Health visiting n = 12 Telephone interviews n = 6
Doctors: paediatricians, obstetricians, GPs n = 5
Public health n = 3
Smoking cessation specialists/staff n = 11
Voluntary sector/children’s centre
staff
n = 2
Pharmacists n = 7
Incentive scheme administrator n = 1
Experts and decision makers n= 24 Participants N=24
Focus groupsa n = 4
Face-to-face interviews n= 3
Telephone interviews n = 7
Public Health, Maternal and Infant Health Conferences n=,63 Participants N=,63 Interactive
recorded group
Range of participants per session involving
policy, decision-makers, experts and some practitioners
discussions at conferences n = 3
aA total of 16 focus groups were conducted. At three focus groups with women/recent parents a provider was present and three focus groups were a mixture of
providers and experts. Two women attended two different focus groups; as did two experts (they are counted once only).
bTwo pregnant women were involved in a follow-up postnatal interview (one of which had an older child at the time of the first interview).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t003
Table 4. Summary of characteristics of women and partner participants.
Women/Partners Not recorded
Ethnicity 78 (88.6%) White 1 (1.2%)
9 (10.2%) BME
Marital Status 68 (77.3%) Married 2 (2.3%)
18 (20.4%) Divorced/Single
Employment Status 43 (48.9%) Employed 5 (5.7%)
40 (45.4%) Unemployed
Smoking Status 26 (29.5%) Never smoked 1 (1.2%)
24 (27.3%) Currently smoking
37 (42.0%) Previously quit
Previous Infant Feeding Behaviours (N = 58)* 51 (87.9%) Previous experience of breastfeeding 3 (5.2%)
4 (6.9%) Formula only
Current Infant Feeding Intentions (N = 18)* 11 (61.1%) Planned to breastfeed
4 (22.2%) Planned to mixed feed
3 (16.7%) Planned to formula feed
*Data collected on Lancashire/Aberdeen women only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t004
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and even ‘resentment’ if the incentive was targeted towards a
particular, ‘undeserving’ population: ‘well that’s my money, going
to my next door neighbour, they don’t have a job’.
For geographically targeted incentives, some participants
expressed concerns towards a ‘postcode lottery’ of care and believed
‘equity’ to be important as everyone needs support. However,
universal incentives could ‘benefit those who already had enough’.
Some professionals believed that targeted provision could help
address embedded ‘social norms’ associated with the target
behaviours. Many participants considered how incentives had
the potential to reduce inequalities through providing access to
items that they could not afford (e.g. breast pump, nursing bras),
and financial support for those who are ‘struggling for money’ to
buy essentials such as ‘food’, ‘things for the baby’ or for a ‘healthier
lifestyle’:
Obviously it is an expensive thing, having a baby and I think
that people who maybe need the income more, it would help
massively. If I’d been in that boat it would have helped
massively (44, I, pregnant woman).
Enhancing or Diminishing Intrinsic Motivation and
Wellbeing
Numerous participants, in discussion of intervention vignettes
such as Tappin et al. [34] and Heil et al. [39] believed that
incentives for smoking cessation and breastfeeding could operate
as a ‘tipping point’ to ‘encourage’ and provide an ‘extra boost’ for
women to adopt healthy behaviours; with the ongoing delivery of
incentives providing ‘something to look forward to’ to ‘push you
[woman] a bit further’. Incentives could provide recognition of
providers and consumers’ achievements promoting ‘well-being’,
‘self-esteem’ for women, and for providers ‘job satisfaction if the
rates improve’.
Some consumers and providers who had been involved in
incentive schemes for smoking cessation and breastfeeding referred
to how women felt ‘privileged’, ‘valued’ and more ‘confident’:
Table 7. Interviews – providers/experts1.
Participant Code2 Profession Provider/Expert
T46 Consultant Obstetrician Provider
T47 Research Manager Voluntary Sector Expert
T48 Public Health Consultant Expert
T49 Health Visitor Provider
T50 Health Visitor Provider
T51 Lead Health Trainer – Smoking Cessation Expert
52 Specialist Midwife (Substance misuse) Provider
53 Hospital Midwife Provider
T54 Senior Clinical Lecturer/Ethics Committee
Member
Expert
T55 Consultant Obstetrician Provider
T56 Tobacco Trainer - Tobacco Control Team Provider
T57 Stop Smoking Service Manager Expert
T58 Smoking Awareness Co-Ordinator Expert
T59 Midwife Provider
T60 Infant Feeding Co-Ordinator Expert
T61 Smoking Cessation Advisor Provider
62 Ethics Committee Member Expert
T63 General Practitioner Provider
T64 Paediatrician (neo-natal) Provider
T65 Paediatrician (general and respiratory) Provider
66 Health Improvement Senior Officer Expert
67 Helpline Manager Expert
68 Midwife Provider
69 Community Midwife Provider
70 Research Nurse Provider
71 Senior Midwife Provider
T72 Smoking Cessation Advisor Provider
T73 Smoking Cessation Advisor Provider
T74 Incentive Scheme Administrator Provider
1Nine CPIT providers/experts took part in an interview; two experts were involved in a voucher incentive intervention for smoking cessation.
2 T relates to a telephone interview; no letter refers to a face to face interview.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t007
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Table 8. Focus groups & interactive discussions – providers/experts1.
Participant Code Profession Provider/Expert
FG5 Peer Supporter* Provider
FG7 Health Visitor* Provider
FG7 Health Visitor* Provider
FG7 Student Nurse/Health Visiting* Provider
FG8 Liaison Worker for Young Mums - Voluntary Sector* Provider
FG9 Senior Public Health Coordinator Expert
FG9 Assistant Director of Nursing and Families Expert
FG9 Infant Feeding Consultant Expert
FG9 Infant Feeding Coordinator2 Expert
FG9 Baby Friendly Coordinator Expert
FG10 Public Health Specialist Provider
FG10 Parentcraft and Infant Feeding Coordinator3 Expert
FG10 Children’s Centre Development Officer Expert
FG10 Infant Feeding Coordinator Expert
FG10 Breastfeeding Peer Support Branch Manager Expert
FG10 Breastfeeding Peer Support Operations Manager Expert
FG10 Breastfeeding Peer Support Coordinator Expert
FG10 Public Health Coordinator Expert
FG10 Health Coordinator Children’s Centres Expert
FG11 Health Visitor Provider
FG11 Health Visitor Provider
FG11 Health Visitor Provider
FG11 Health Visitor Provider
FG11 Health Visitor Provider
FG11 Health Visitor Provider
FG11 Health Visitor Provider
FG12 Public Health Practitioner Provider
FG12 Health Education Practitioner Provider
FG13 Community Midwife Provider
FG13 Community Midwife Provider
FG13 Community Midwife Provider
FG13 Community Midwife Provider
FG13 Community Midwife Provider
FG13 Community Midwife Coordinator Expert
FG14 Community Pharmacist Provider
FG14 Community Pharmacist Provider
FG14 Community Pharmacist Provider
FG14 Community Pharmacist Provider
FG14 Community Pharmacist Provider
FG14 Community Pharmacist Provider
FG14 Community Pharmacist Provider
FG15 Smoking Cessation Advisor Provider
FG15 Smoking Cessation Advisor Provider
FG15 Smoking Cessation Advisor Provider
FG15 Smoking Cessation Advisor Provider
FG15 Smoking Cessation Advisor Provider
FG16 Helpline Staff Provider
FG16 Helpline Staff Provider
IA14 Infant & Nutrition Conference 2011 (n = 30+) Providers & Experts
IA24 Infant & Nutrition Conference 2013 (n = 15) Providers & Experts
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I felt quite privileged they picked me for any group [research
study incentive group] […] I felt quite happy that they had
actually considered putting me in one of the groups because I
never thought I was going to get into any of the groups to start
with (43, I, pregnant woman).
A few professionals reflected that incentives would provide
vulnerable individuals with one of the first opportunities to receive
a reward and acknowledgement for an achievement. Unrestrictive
incentives like shopping vouchers could provide the most
disadvantaged families with a rare opportunity for autonomy to
‘make decisions about what they ought to be spending the additional
money on’, such as providing ‘treats’ for themselves and their
families.
Other professionals when discussing the Cattaneo et al vignette
[43] considered how provider incentives could diminish health
professional’s intrinsic motivation to support the target behaviours:
Then they [health professionals] are not actually being
motivated by increasing people to breastfeed, they are going to
be motivated by the fear of the humiliation if they don’t get
there (IA2, providers & experts).
A number of the participants believed that incentives for
smoking cessation could diminish women’s personal motivation by
discouraging quitting prior to enrolling in the programme, thereby
reducing ‘health choices to a financial transaction’, or even
incentivise ‘people to get pregnant’. While some consumers
considered this unlikely; ‘why damage your body if you don’t
actually already do it’, incentives of higher value were generally
believed to be associated with a greater likelihood of ‘gaming and
cheating’ ‘but £750, like I say I would I start smoking for that’.
Relapse after the incentive had been withdrawn, due to ‘people
stopping for the wrong reasons’ and re-access ‘get the voucher,
spend it, then start again’ were highlighted by many.
Participants also raised apprehensions with regard to vouchers
that had a ‘currency’ value and could be exchanged for
inappropriate items, e.g. ‘cigarettes’, ‘formula milk’ ‘illicit drugs’
or ‘alcohol’. Restrictions on voucher use, such as within the CPIT
trial where general shopping vouchers could not be used for
cigarettes or alcohol, or behaviour related incentives (i.e. a breast
pump discussed in the context of the Chamberlain et al [37]
intervention vignette) or small low value personal gifts were felt to
be less open to abuse:
You can imagine they are probably open to some sort of
manipulation especially if the rewards are financial rather
than the recognition of a mile stone, a badge, a picture frame
(T6, I, mother).
Other ‘gaming and cheating’ concerns were raised by partic-
ipants with regard to how provider incentives may lead to staff
‘skewing’ their records, or women taking ‘advantage’ of the
schemes, through making ‘fraudulent claims’ and ‘lying’ to ensure
eligibility. These anxieties were magnified due to the perceived
fallibility of ‘proof’; ‘no real way of knowing if women are actually
continuing to breastfeed’. For smoking, there was some concern
expressed that women may learn how to cheat when given Carbon
Monoxide (CO) breath tests to confirm smoking status. CO can
only capture recent smoking (in the past 12 hours) and there was
some speculation that women might be able to abstain just for that
period to obtain the incentive. However, this issue was not evident
within the CPIT trial data from service providers:
So far the people that I have engaged with that have signed
up to the service to me, bar one, I feel have been one hundred
percent genuine (T72, I, smoking cessation advisor).
Many participants considered that verification of behaviour
change was crucial to prevent the schemes coming into ‘disrepute’.
Relationships with Others
When discussing the Walsh et al. [42] and Cattaneo et al. [43]
intervention vignettes, some participants considered how incen-
tives to providers to meet targets for smoking cessation in
pregnancy and breastfeeding could contribute to a ‘shared aim’
across different individuals and services and getting ‘everybody on
board in some shape or part’. Incentives to consumers could also
operate as ‘enablers’ for ongoing contact with services:
Sometimes, when you are feeling like rubbish and your house
is a mess and you think ‘‘oh I can’t be bothered with somebody
else coming round now’’, you’ve got the health visitor and
you’ve got you know all the other…. and you think ‘‘oh
another person coming round to look at me’’, but I think the
incentives definitely can well …I will get a present from this
one (T9, I, mother).
Regular women–provider contact, such as depicted within the
Heil et al. [39] intervention vignette and the opportunity to
demonstrate ‘value’ to women through incentive delivery was
believed to help create a ‘positive effect’ on the women–provider
relationship, assist women-centred care and make it ‘easier for
staff’ to encourage women to adopt healthy behaviours.
From a counter perspective, women ‘being paid to do something
that they should do without question for the health of the baby’ could
cause resentment amongst providers. A few professionals voiced
concerns of feeling ‘embarrassed’ in ‘selling’ incentives to women.
Many consumers as well as professionals in response to the
Table 8. Cont.
Participant Code Profession Provider/Expert
IA34 Public Health Conference 2012 (n = 18) Providers & Experts
1 14 CPIT providers took part in focus groups; one expert was involved in NW England breastfeeding incentive intervention.
2 Participant also took part in FG10.
3 Participant also took part in FG12.
* Participants took part in focus groups with women.
4 Interactive discussions that involved a mixture of practitioners and experts, a number of who had been involved in smoking cessation/breastfeeding incentive
interventions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t008
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Cattaneo et al intervention vignette [43] reported that provider
incentives could lead to women ‘feeling bombarded’, ‘bullied’ or
‘inappropriately handled’ in attempts to ‘manipulate people into a
particular behaviour’; which in turn could exacerbate unhealthy
behaviours, i.e. women ‘smoking even more’ or being less inclined
to breastfeed. Other concerns were how providers may incorpo-
rate ‘bias and opinions rather than research and fact’ and
provider–women interactions relegated to a ‘tick-box’ exercise;
Table 9. Characteristics of the maternity and early years health professional sample (n = 497).
Variable Classes Sample (%)
Sex Male 64 (12.9)
Female 411 (82.7)
Missing 22 (4.4)
Age 18–34 91 (18.3)
35–44 114 (22.9)
45–54 182 (36.6)
55. 85 (17.1)
Missing 25 (5.0)
Ethnicity White 444 (89.3)
BME/prefer not to say 53 (10.7)
White British 339 (68.2)
White Irish 7 (1.4)
White Other 1 (0.2)
Mixed W/B Caribbean 1 (0.2)
Mixed Other 1 (0.2)
Asian Indian 10 (2.1)
Asian Pakistani 2 (0.4)
Asian Chinese 1 (0.2)
Black African 2 (0.4)
Refused 35 (7.0)
Smoking status Never smoked 370 (74.5)
Current smoker, tried to stop smoking 17 (3.4)
Current smoker, not tried to stop smoking 1 (0.2)
Ex-smoker 101 (20.3)
Declined to answer 8 (1.6)
Any children Yes 401 (80.7)
No 96 (19.3)
Breastfeeding Any children breastfed 387 (77.9)
No children breastfed 110 (22.1)
Job General Practitioner 132 (26.6)
Health visitor 47 (9.5)
Manager 20 (4.0)
Midwife 121 (24.4)
Obstetrician 12 (2.4)
Maternity staff 29 (5.8)
Paediatrician 12 (2.4)
Other nurse 41 (8.3)
Public health staff 32 (6.4)
AHP 18 (3.6)
Support role 8 (1.6)
Researcher 4 (0.8)
Missing 21 (4.2)
Survey region England 60 (12.1)
Scotland 437 (87.9)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t009
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with efforts focused on targets ‘rather than healthcare’ and
neglecting non-target areas: ‘bottle-feeding women having even
less support’.
Some participants considered how incentives delivery could
negatively impact on the ‘therapeutic relationship’ creating
‘distrust’ between women and providers, with women left feeling
‘judged and alienated from their health care givers’:
You’ve got to think about how these mums feel when they don’t
want to breastfeed at all, then you’re bombarding them with it,
and they won’t have any relationship and you’ve lost every
Table 10. Response rates to free text questions in the professional survey (n = 497).
Positive consequences
of incentives
to participants
and/or staff
(smoking
cessation)
Negative
consequences of
incentives to
participants and/or
staff
(smoking cessation)
Positive consequences
of incentives to participants
and/or
staff (breastfeeding)
Negative consequences of
incentives to participants
and/or staff (breastfeeding)
Provided comments N (%) 377 (75.9%) 372 (74.9%) 358 (72.1%) 338 (68.0%)
No data entered. N (%) 93 (18.7%) 102 (20.5%) 110 (22.1%) 121(24.3%)
Stated ‘‘no consequences’’ or
‘‘unsure’’ N (%)
27 (5.4%) 23 (4.6%) 29 (5.8%) 38 (7.6%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t010
Table 11. Key emergent themes for unintended consequences of incentives.
Addressing or Creating Inequalities
Positive Negative
- Encouraging/maintaining access to health - Most disadvantaged less likely to access
care - Unfairness of incentives
- Provides disadvantaged families - Marginalisation/divisive
with additional income/items not able to - Post-code lottery of care
Afford - Withdrawal from health services
Enhancing or Diminishing Intrinsic Motivation and Wellbeing
Positive Negative
- Tipping point - Gaming & cheating/fallibility of proof
- Reward and recognition - Limited efficacy once incentive withdrawn
- Increased motivation and job satisfaction - Reduction in staff motivation
- Rare opportunity for autonomy and choice
Relationships with Others
Positive Negative
- Shared aim - Impaired provider-women interactions
- Positive provider-women relationships - Negative social, emotional and health impact of
- Encourage others to adopt health non-incentivized others within personal networks
behaviours - Nanny state, reduced autonomy
- Wider community benefits - Pressure, guilt and perceptions of failure
Impact on Health Systems and Resources
Positive Negative
- Endorsement and focus by health services - Negative publicity for health services
- Cost savings of improved health - Waste of health service resources/opportunity
- Specialist training/targeted provision costs
- Expect ‘payment’ for other health behaviours
- Increased workload for staff
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.t011
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other good thing you could do with them (FG11, health
visitors).
A few participants reported that women’s involvement in
incentive schemes could create ‘social connectivity’ through being
‘part of something’ and knowing that their involvement ‘could help
other people’. However, failure or relapse could create additional
strain on women through fears of ‘letting her [provider] down’.
Withdrawal or non-eligibility of incentive schemes for women who
were unable to breastfeed or quit smoking was considered by
many participants to ‘penalise those who have tried’ creating
‘stress’, ‘pressure’ and ‘blame’, leading to ‘reduced self-esteem’,
‘depression’ ‘guilt’ and feelings of ‘failure’ and ‘inadequacy’:
Breastfeeding is not always a personal choice whether you can
or not, whereas smoking you are personally responsible,
whereas breastfeeding no matter how hard you try you might
not be able to do it (17, grandmother).
A number of professionals, in reflection of the Cattaneo et al
intervention vignette [43] believed that provider incentives would
create stress through staff having to ‘confront’ and ‘challenge’ those
whose ‘claims are disproved’. Some professionals also expressed
that the pressure of target attainment could ‘demoralise’ staff,
leading to a situation where they ‘disengage and don’t deliver
effectively’ or even result in an ‘increase in sickness levels’.
Many participants considered incentive provision to be
‘patronising’ and to ‘infantilise women’ through re-enforcing a
‘paternalistic’, ‘nanny state’ ethos. The potential for creating new
social or health care norms could potentially diminish individual
responsibility for making healthy choices and shift the balance
‘from being a responsible mother to ‘‘the NHS will sort me out’’’:
We’re health, you know. It’s your own health, take some
responsibility. I think we’re going right down the wrong route;
I think that, you know, when we’re enticing people with money
and gifts just to do what’s right for their health’ (53, midwife).
Signing up to an incentive scheme was believed to have wider
benefits for healthy behaviours ‘cascading’ to staff, family members
and other members of the women’s personal networks; creating
‘health improvement for all the family’ and ‘healthy competition’ in
achieving behaviour change. Consumers and professionals
through discussion of the Gulliver et al. [38] and Heil et al. [39]
intervention vignettes for smoking cessation also felt that while it
was harder for partners to stop smoking ‘as a woman has a reason
to’; the potential to engage them could help to share the
responsibility for health, rather than the sole onus being placed
on the woman:
Both of them are in it together then, they’re not feeling as if
one is responsible for this if the baby is compromised, you
know, I would hope even if they didn’t stop smoking, which I
hope that they would, but if the baby was compromised they
couldn’t blame one or other. It’s meeting the point that both of
them are responsible for this baby (T59, midwife).
Participants also expressed ‘vested interests’ in supporting
incentive schemes to prevent passive smoke exposure ‘being
surrounded by people puffing away on fags’; encouraging women
to ‘set a good example’, ‘raise community awareness’ and create
‘positive cultural change’ by normalising not smoking and
breastfeeding:
If breastfeeding becomes more, people start thinking of
breastfeeding once again as the norm then it will be easier
for other people to do it, until it gets to such a point where it
will be considered unusual to be going onto formula feed a
baby straight after birth (T6, I, mother).
Conversely, some participants felt that the adoption of positive
health behaviours could lead to social isolation for women ‘if all
their family and friends are smokers’. The women’s efforts may be
thwarted by ‘unsupportive partners and family members’ and have
adverse consequences for personal network relationships with
‘everyone smoking around me’. The health benefits of quitting
smoking in pregnancy were seen by some as subsequently ‘erased’
if the baby still resides within a ‘smoking household’.
A few professionals raised concerns about ‘domestic abuse’ in
terms of how women may be pressurised by partners to sign up
when they are ‘maybe not really 100% wanting to’ or for ‘people
taking those vouchers off those women as they walk out the door’.
Impact on Health Systems and Resources
Investment in incentive programmes, despite the ‘hard strapped’
situation of the UK NHS was perceived by many of the
participants to be an important endorsement of the ‘seriousness’
of not smoking and breastfeeding and a positive ‘pro-active’ rather
than reactive stance to health promotion. A number of the
participants considered how incentives were not ‘a lot of money’
compared to the long-term savings on health-related conditions
associated with smoking and not breastfeeding; although some felt
that evidence was needed prior to wide-scale rollout:
I think it’s fantastic if it does work, because really if four
hundred pounds during pregnancy does work fantastic to the
cost of the NHS because you can have so much less extra scans
during the pregnancy, complications during the pregnancy,
less babies born premature, less still birth, less cot death, it’s
going to cost the NHS thousands and thousands and
thousands of pounds, millions really (FG15, I, smoking
cessation advisors).
Cost savings due to reduced workloads for health service staff
and how a ‘healthier workforce’, particularly in relation to smoking
cessation, would result in employers having lower absenteeism
rates were raised. Some professionals also stated how organisation
incentives to meet targets could provide invaluable opportunities
for needs-led service development; ‘to buy something for our
service’.
From a more negative perspective, many participants believed
that incentive programmes could create a ‘bad image’ and
‘negative publicity’ as a ‘waste’ of tax payers’ money and health
service resources. In the current adverse economic climate,
participants considered incentives to be the ‘wrong use of money’
when the health service was faced with ‘cut backs affecting
visitation times’ and hospitals ‘trying to clear debts’ as well as the
opportunity costs for resourcing other services:
If they [general public] thought they were actually getting
money, just because there is so many cut backs, they may be
seeing it that they’ve got an elderly relative with Alzheimer’s
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or something like that or nursing home fees (66, I, health
improvement senior officer).
Others expressed how the increased expectations of payments
for ‘other’ health behaviours, such as ‘obesity’, ‘healthy eating’,
‘alcoholics’ or ‘drug addictions’ could be a consequence:
Because if you start, obviously with the incentives with the
breastfeeding, and they are smoking, well where do you draw
the line (T11, I, mother).
The Cattaneo et al vignette [43] stimulated views from
professionals that provider incentives were important to focus
efforts on these behaviours and make sure ‘staff are more highly
skilled’. CPIT providers reported how the initial ‘chaos’ and
‘resistance’ experienced when the incentive scheme was introduced
‘settled down overtime’. However, many professionals raised
concerns about the associated costs of appointing committed,
dedicated and skilled staff to deliver incentive programmes, and
the potential implications of training, paperwork, administration,
organisation, delivery and ‘policing’ of incentive delivery on
‘overstretched staff’ who were faced with ‘competing priorities’:
More staff input is a costly affair and staff are already under
stress due to lack of time and resources so extra people would
have to be recruited to implement these incentives and not just
be added on to job descriptions (S164, midwife).
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the
experienced and anticipated unintended consequences of incentive
provision to either women or service providers for smoking
cessation in pregnancy and breastfeeding. Findings highlight
controversial and oppositional views towards financial incentives
with ethical, political, cultural, social and psychological implica-
tions. We report how incentives can address or create inequalities;
enhance or diminish intrinsic motivation and wellbeing, and how
they may have a positive or negative impact on relationships
within their personal networks and/or health providers. While
incentives may raise awareness and direct service delivery to areas
of need, this may be detrimental to other areas of health care. This
detailed exposition thereby provides new insights into positive and
negative consequences, as well as why, how and for whom these
consequences might occur.
The strengths of this study include the mixed methods, multi-
disciplinary, three site approach, which enabled us to engage with
consumers and providers with and without direct experience of
incentive interventions and the target behaviours. Data collection
was undertaken by five researchers over a prolonged period of
time. This resulted in variations in terms of how the interview and
focus group questions were framed. Access to more disadvantaged
settings and sampling techniques enabled us to obtain a broad
range of views from participants with diverse socio-economic and
behaviour characteristics, including participants who seldom
engage in health services research. The limitations relate to where
only restricted views were collected and the characteristics of the
sample, despite every effort to recruit ‘‘harder to reach’’
participants. The White ethnic study population (88.6% of
women/significant others and 89.3% of survey respondents) is
slightly higher than census data for England (80.8%) [46] and
Scotland (92.9%) [47]. In addition a much higher percentage of
the women/significant others were married (77.3%) compared
with rates for England in 2011 of (46.6%) [48]. A large percentage
of the survey participants had never smoked (74.5%), which would
be expected for health professionals. Furthermore only a small
number of the women reported that they had not tried to
breastfeed or planned to formula feed, perhaps reflecting that 80%
of UK women initiate breastfeeding [49] or desirable response
bias. In addition, limited views from wider family members were
collected. Researchers selected the study vignettes from the
evidence syntheses and drafted the shortlist of incentive strategies
to frame the incentives. However, with service-user co-applicant
input vignettes were also a strength, as the concrete scenarios
enabled participants to highlight issues from a more individualised,
reflective perspective than would have been achieved using more
abstract question–answer techniques. A further limitation may
relate to how the interviews/focus groups asked individuals to
reflect on ‘consequences’ of incentives; whereas the survey
specifically asked individuals to report on positive and negative
consequences. In the light of our findings, more focused topic
guides may well elicit additional insights, and this should be
addressed within future studies. The limitations of the health
professional survey are discussed fully elsewhere [14]. In partic-
ular, the free text question followed specific Likert Scale questions
about agreement with our shortlist of seven most promising
financial incentive strategies, which included shopping vouchers, a
free breast pump and provider payments for meeting targets.
Therefore it is possible that the free text responses could have been
interpreted in the context of responses to the earlier questions. As
non-response bias is also a concern, the free text data was only
used for triangulation purposes.
Our findings on incentives to service providers support those
previously reported for a wider range of health outcomes, in terms
of how incentives can narrow health equalities through facilitating
access to healthcare [4,26]. While universal provision of incentives
to consumers could guard against a postcode lottery of care,
targeted support was important to engage those most at need and
address embedded social norms. However, we identified the
potential for differential uptake across social classes and the
potential for health inequalities to increase, as noted for other
lifestyle behaviour change interventions [50]. Of concern a MORI
survey of the public acceptability of our shortlist of incentive
strategies conducted as part of the BIBS study revealed important
differences in attitudes between the more and less educated, and
between women and men [14,51]. Women compared to men were
more likely to disagree with shopping voucher incentives for
smoking cessation or breastfeeding, and those with lower levels of
education, a reliable proxy for disadvantage [52], disagreed more
with smoking cessation incentives and a breast pump [14,51]. The
assumption of governments that incentives will forge partnerships
to deliver better health outcomes, reduce health inequalities and
build social capital requires further testing.
At an individual level, incentives were the tipping point for some
women, the opportunity that facilitated change [53]. However, as
reported by others, concerns were raised that incentives could
‘‘crowd out’’ intrinsic motivation [4,6,7]. As incentives were
identified to have the potential to enhance wellbeing, and
wellbeing is identified as an important driver in behaviour-related
infant feeding decisions [54], preferences for incentives that
increase positive affect and add value for women as connectors for
continued support [29] rather than diminish intrinsic motivation
should be considered. How the consequences of incentives for
behaviour change might impact either positively or negatively
beyond the individual to social networks, communities and
engagement within services is uncertain.
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Media debates on the use of financial incentives have tended to
be negative [55,56]. However, a UK population based study by
Promberger and colleagues to assess the acceptability of incentive-
based treatments for smoking cessation and weight loss reported
that the acceptability of financial incentives is not necessarily
negative but rather contingent on the target behaviour, the type of
incentive and their effectiveness [57]. Whilst positive unintended
consequences have been reported in the literature [4,18,28,29] our
study also illustrates positive consequences that have received little
attention to date. Autonomy is of particular note where incentives
are perceived as bribes which can undermine free will and reflect a
‘nanny state’ resulting in diminished individual responsibility for
health choices [58]. In contrast, consumers and professionals in
our study reported that unrestricted vouchers can promote
individual autonomy for the most disadvantaged through provid-
ing a rare opportunity for choice and self-reward. Similarly
discourses of incentives as ‘unfair’ for rewarding ‘bad behaviour’,
of discouraging individual responsibility or for targeting only
disadvantaged communities contrast with narratives of feeling
valued, more confident and improved self-esteem. Our interpre-
tation is that media debates on the advantages and disadvantages
of financial incentives can be easily biased towards intellectual
philosophical, political and ethical arguments about the role of the
state, without considering the perspectives of more disadvantaged
families who are struggling to do the best for their children. This is
particularly important as children have no choice and public
acceptability is greatest for incentives to protect their wellbeing [2].
Related issues of ‘gaming and cheating’ were reported in terms
of duplicitous activities amongst consumers and providers
[17,18,25,26], particularly when verifiable ‘proof’ of these
behaviours was difficult to obtain. As incentives of higher values
are believed to have a stronger correlation associated with
unintended consequences [59,60] consideration of the value and
type (e.g. financial or behavioural) to mitigate against gaming
behaviours appears crucial. The potential positive and negative
impact of incentive schemes on provider–women relationships in
our study are evident in the literature: increased access and
improved rapport [29]; mistrust and alienation [4,30] and limiting
support for non-target behaviours [4,5]. These findings highlight
the need for sensitive, authentic, person-centred communication
[61] as women dislike feeling judged or pressurised to behave in a
way deemed appropriate by others [54,62].
While incentives may have the potential to create shared aims,
oppositional views emerged with regard to the impact of incentives
on other health outcomes and service delivery. From one
perspective, the investment in incentives would enable specialist
and targeted services to be developed as reported by Cahill &
Petera [18] and Gillam et al. [4]. However, the recent economic
downturn led to views that investment in incentives was
impractical, unethical and immoral, as well as creating expecta-
tions of ‘payments’ for other health-related behaviours [26].
Contentions largely centred on potential opportunity costs.
However, in line with key government priorities of health
promotion and prevention, a pro-active approach and associated
funding to address these pervasive health behaviours were believed
to have long-term benefits of reduced health costs, staff time and
absenteeism rates.
A checklist has been developed to help decision makers assess
when incentives might do more good than harm, to help prevent
premature or inappropriate implementation [28]. This checklist
highlights some of the key areas of contention in terms of
ascertaining a) effectiveness of incentives prior to roll-out; b)
appropriate targeting and eligibility criteria; c) valid and indepen-
dent verification of behaviour outcomes; d) the implications of
incentives on behaviours and motivation and e) that the benefits
outweigh the potential for negative consequences in relation to
‘attention shift’ in terms of decreasing efforts in other health-care
areas; ‘gaming’ behaviours and implications for the provider-
consumer relationship. While this checklist highlights the need for
systems and structures to be in place to prevent against negative
consequences, our study emphasises how unintended positive
consequences of incentive provision also require consideration.
Conclusion
The utility and acceptability of incentive provision is a
controversial area, which can generate emotive and oppositional
responses. Assumptions that incentives will help to address health
inequalities, increase the reach of behaviour change interventions
and facilitate a cultural shift towards desired behaviours require
rigorous testing given the conflicting narratives around conse-
quences. Prospective mixed methods approaches at the incentive
intervention design and feasibility stages are needed, together with
consideration of potential unintended consequences at all levels of
service provision: for the participants, the population and those
delivering the incentives and services. Process evaluations are also
needed to capture the unintended consequences during a trial,
with longer term follow up of key areas of concern after a trial has
ended.
When planning an incentive intervention, care should be taken
to assess discipline bias (e.g. philosophical, political, ethical, health)
in narratives around personal autonomy, the role of the state and
responsibility. These can be contrasted to personal narratives from
less often heard voices representing the target population that
incentives aim to help. Anticipation of positive and negative
unintended consequences should be integral to the planning,
design and implementation of interventions that include incen-
tives, helping to ensure that any benefits are maximised.
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